What is the best model for governance? Is it liberal democracy, as Francis Fukuyama claimed to be the “End of History”, as the other alternatives — Communism and Fascism collapsed? Or is the best model for governance dependent on whether the leaders are able to achieve the desired results relative to their national and regional context and constraints?
Context is the repeated patterns that ask what results should be achieved. Constraints, meanwhile, ask how difficult the process is for the results to be achieved. Constraints can be read as an excuse for not pursuing urgent and ambitious policies that a country’s context desperately demands. Successful results themselves are also dependent on how high leadership analytical quality is regarding reading context and constraints, and implementation.
So how does this show in three examples of statebuilding and governance: US, Western Europe and Asia Pacific?
The US sought to prevent over-centralisation yet have a sustainable constitutional republic. This was shaped by its context of 13 settler colonies that revolted against the British monarchy’s taxation without representation. This necessitated the constitutional protection of the citizen, separation of powers, and division between federal and state powers. This also meant that the state is expected to protect the market-oriented economy through monetary stability of the Federal Reserve. Substantial state intervention occurred during crises against predatory monopolies under the Progressive Era. Other forms of intervention were seen in stimulating economic demand in the New Deal projects in response to the Great Depression in 1929-1933, along with the 2009 GFC American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.
Post-1945, Western Europe desired for prosperous sovereign nation states that could be constrained to prevent another repeat of the two world wars. This time was shaped by the rise of totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany and USSR, who exploited interwar economic downturns to commit mass atrocities. However, the desire for balance between prosperous sovereign states and European stability, faced the challenge of sheer diversity of Europe and the loss of colonial riches. Thus was needed, the creation of a single European market for coal and steel, combined with strong state planning. Then, emerged strong markets that coexisted with strong social welfare systems and large state owned enterprises, especially in France. Moreover, strong independent institutions that prevented electoral majorities from abusing individual rights were constructed.
During the post-colonial era , Asia Pacific’s main goal was to develop powerful functioning centralised states that could rapidly catch up to and rival the US and Europe. This was shaped by repeated premodern experiences of Confucianism-Legalism’s preference of strong central authority against the backdrop of factionalism and colonialism. The aim for a powerful centralised modern state faced the constraints of scarcity in sovereignty, wealth, experience of modern statebuilding. Moreover, postcolonial Asian states were confronted with profound land inequities that obstructed agricultural socio-economic mobility. Thus, this necessitated the creation of authoritarian or hybrid regimes, especially in East and some parts of Southeast Asia ,who saw liberal democratic models, creating excessive veto points to rapid mobilisation of resources to quickly develop infrastructure such as railways, factories, ports and schools and break up landowning elites.
The US, Europe, Asia-Pacific fulfilled success in their initial context and constraints, but faced difficulties as such limits never were static. The US, through political economic experimentation and evolution was able to become a superpower. Yet the growing polarisation and centralisation under Trump challenges the concept of a sustainable federal constitutional republic. The Western European single market was successful in constraining economically powerful states. But from the 2000s, onwards, this became a continental European project that juggled 27 different member states’ interests with growing geopolitical competition and stagnation. For Asia, the rapid transformation from catching-up to advanced economies has led to policymakers struggling to deal with more educated, politically active and technologically sophisticated societies in just one generation.
Today, the constant focus of democratic backsliding has obscured the other possibility that citizens are expressing their discontent with unresponsive institutions, especially in Western liberal democracies. Whilst Euro-American liberal democracies have traditionally delivered high standards of living, social outcomes and political responsiveness, their geographic concentration, along with domestic strain, has raised fair questions of whether it is the universal “best political model”. Similarly, the rapid rise of Asia into rich economies under non-liberal-democratic frameworks has reinforced the importance of evaluating governance that is not prejudiced against its actual context and constraints of scarcity in wealth, security and sovereignty.
In conclusion, if the contexts and constraints are volatile, which principle can we find stability in? This article narrows the one broad principle that can be consistent yet surprisingly bland: leaders and institutions, with regards to their national contexts and constraints, serve at the best of their abilities for their citizen’s welfare.
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Image Credit: Pxfuel, Carol M. Highsmith
