by Konstancija Kevisaite
There is a lingering feeling before a journalist presses the “send” button in one of Moscow’s news agencies. The email to the publisher is drafted, and yet the fingers do not initiate the action. While it seems that the words fall in their belonging places, the journalist’s eyes search for any signs of human error, any information that the institution operating behind closed doors does not want the public to know… the Roskomnadzor.
The Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media, also known as Roskomnadzor, is the main enforcer of media regulations in Russia. While independent media has never been the strongest suit of the Russian Federation regime, the Yarovaya laws, enacted in 2018, expanded the state’s authority by introducing new data-collection requirements and mandating encryption. Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, authorities have intensified restrictions on individual rights and freedoms in the media and other aspects of public life. This article will focus on Roskomnadzor’s institutional framework and how it implements strategies to target domestic and foreign media users online.
As an institution for media control, Roskomnadzor has a wide range of actions at its disposal. First and foremost, since 2019, with the passing of a ‘Sovereign Internet’ law, it has controlled media freedom by retaining the right to physically disconnect Russia’s internet from the international network in the event of a “threat”. In fact, testing conducted, preparing for total disconnection of services during potential unrest, resulted in recent regional internet outages in Chechnya, Dagestan, and Ingushetia. Additionally, Roskomnadzor has blocked about 200 VPN services and blocked foreign sites’ IP addresses from accessing Russian government sites and social media. Even domestic bloggers and influencers with more than 10,000 followers are subjected to state monitoring and advertising bans if they fail to comply with the law and do not register with the institution.
Roskomnadzor’s penalties are intentionally vague. They impose ex post facto penalties, meaning warnings are issued after publication, often followed by criminal or administrative repercussions. Vague regulations go hand in hand with the principle of uncertainty that creates an “informational vacuum” for those working in the media (Akhrarkhodjaeva, 2017). The theory explains the rules of the reporting game by assuming that no one really knows how to act, what is allowed, and what is not. For instance, while Roskomandzor strictly prohibits ‘swear words’, it does not specify or provide a list of the forbidden vocabulary. Therefore, reporters must double-check and self-censor their work, as it is almost impossible to tell if a specific publication might trigger a warning from Roskomnadzor.
This media strategy, institutionalised by the Russian state, is called ‘reflexive control’ (Predoană, Stăiculescu, and Stan, 2024). While traditional propaganda and disinformation aim to influence the general population’s opinion, reflexive control focuses primarily on the adversary’s decision-making and transmits fabricated data that would favour the watchbase to initiate some sort of destructive action. It strives to create an altered or non-conforming reality that contradicts real-life events, which one could call a model of confusion. The model of confusion is best understood through the example of troll factories. Based in St. Petersburg, troll factories use different teams to operate on opposing sides of a topic and foster extreme antagonism while simulating debates on social media. Trolls even step into neighbourhood Facebook groups to comment under lawn mower ads to express their opinions on corruption.
Lastly, building a Kremlin narrative is hardly possible without television. The study by Polina Eremenko (2024) analyses the Russian talk show Evening with Vladimir Solovyov, which has been aired more frequently since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and portrays Russia as a victim of the war. Since this talk show is accessible not only to domestic viewers but also to those in countries that can broadcast Channel One, building a Kremlin narrative there can be exceptionally influential. Russia presents itself as a country with peaceful intentions and seeks to foster global harmony beyond its geopolitical interests, inviting guest speakers from the military and political spheres. It takes on the role of preserver of traditional values endangered by what the Kremlin’s narrative calls the ‘collective West’. Finally, the one-sided narrative built during the talk show creates a strong sense of antagonism among the domestic audience, serving as a censorship measure that limits opposing views because they do not fit the desired discourse.
To conclude, the erosion of media freedom in Russia is being carried out through a gradual, strategic, and legal process that targets creators, journalists, and ordinary internet users. In the current media age, it is impossible to ignore the restrictions imposed by the regime and how it shapes the narrative to the advantage of autocracy, showing how the rise of digital authoritarianism can pose serious challenges in a new media age.
