Does Life End at the Grind?

Notes on Identity and Creating a Self Outside Productivity

by Yatika Singh

It was my first semester at university when the question arose, innocuously, over what I remember as an otherwise unremarkable conversation.

“So, what are your hobbies?”

They showed me their handpainted collection of miniature figurines, waiting for my response. I said I liked to read, which was true — or had been true — before I had quietly stopped picking up my ongoing book for longer than I could comfortably admit. Reading was a hobby, but I had not finished a book in the last six months.

“But what are your interests outside of that? Like, cooking, writing poetry, something?” I said I mostly just liked books. The conversation left a sour taste in my mouth, not because it was unkind, but because of how consequential that question would turn out to be for the rest of that first semester. That day, on the walk home, I retrieved a memory of my pre-teen self going to weekend art classes with Mr. LB. They were the most joyful hours I had outside of school, that and Kathak.

Then I remembered grade six, freshly arrived at boarding school, hearing an announcement calling for ‘art kids’ to help create materials for a school event, and telling myself quietly: “I don’t really do art. Even if I do, it’s not as great as the others.” There was no proof of this. It was just a direct consequence of a label I had somewhere allowed to be fastened onto me, “not somebody who ‘did’ art”, and I had reorganised myself around it without questioning it once. Somewhere between ten and twelve, I began to find my creative self unreliable — I went from being an excited kid in my weekend art class who couldn’t wait to graduate from acrylic painting to oil pastels to sketching anatomy, to shying away from producing something worth hanging on a dorm noticeboard. This distance only increased over the course of high school.

I had not noticed this happening because I was too busy building the other version of myself, the legible one. This is probably a relatable image for some readers: by the end of high school, priorities had narrowed down to three items: finding the right college, earning the right grades, and distinguishing myself through extracurriculars, which were incidentally and almost immediately translated into CV lines and application essays. Our increasingly competitive culture makes this feel not only reasonable but necessary; increasingly, the question we ask each other at parties, at orientation weeks, at every new beginning, is not who are you but what do you do; and the answer is always a job title, a degree or a firm name. I forgot how to answer these questions without reaching out for these heuristics myself. Besides, how do we reconcile the doing with the being, especially when so many of us are on paths that divorce the two every day?

By the time I arrived at university, I had turned a lot of my interests and passions into neat metrics, and allowing myself to simply spill over as a human being had become genuinely difficult. Everyone around me seemed to have something, something they spent their weekends on for no other reason than that they loved it, something with no value to a resume that did not need any. I had forgotten what that felt like. More importantly, where was the room for play? Underneath the forgetting was a growing feeling I had started, quietly and then less quietly, to feed into: that I must create, produce something, do something that was not in service of anything except itself. I returned to my sketchbook, started scouring tarot wikis again, and re-introduced myself to journalling from time to time.

The people I find myself looking up to most, professionally and beyond, all have one thing in common, and it is that they have allowed themselves to remain large. Expansive personalities with expansive interests and an expansive curiosity that they followed into their work until the personal and the professional stopped being separate pursuits at all. Their best work is highly personalised to themselves, their ideas, instead of an attempt to fit a culturally-dictated blueprint of acceptability. What enables them to keep creating and becoming is a capacity to ‘play’, which is often discussed online today as an antidote to linear capitalist ambition.

What I am trying to do now is orient myself towards making amateur attempts. I want to learn new crafts, make things with my hands, translating the many thoughts and ideas for art and writing in my head into the physical world. Sometimes all that entails is asking a question probing enough for a week’s worth of rumination (illumination?) and bidding my honesty and courage to the answer – the making and the discovering and the finding of it all:

You do not have to be good.

You do not have to walk on your knees

for a hundred miles through the desert repenting.

You only have to let the soft animal of your body

love what it loves.

Tell me about despair, yours, and I will tell you mine.

Meanwhile the world goes on.

Meanwhile the sun and the clear pebbles of the rain

are moving across the landscapes,

over the prairies and the deep trees,

the mountains and the rivers.

Meanwhile the wild geese, high in the clean blue air,

are heading home again.

Whoever you are, no matter how lonely,

the world offers itself to your imagination,

calls to you like the wild geese, harsh and exciting—

over and over announcing your place

in the family of things.

Wild Geese, Mary Oliver

Shanghai, Hong Kong, Seoul, Singapore, Taipei on Your Tiktok: Prosperity from Authoritarian Development

by Patrick Luo

The Sci-Fi metro stations were clean, ticketing barriers accepting QR Codes and services every 3 minutes. On the train, eyes were on phones, not always on belongings. As I left the station, my Vivo phone snapped a scene: the bright skyscrapers above the parks where residents played freely, whilst my nose captured the smell of Sichuan hotpot. 

This is the China we see on our trips or phones.  

But just 30 years ago, it was dominated by construction sites as the leadership passed decisions, whilst ensuring dissent was controlled.

If we enjoy China and Asia that developed rapidly with authoritarianism, why do we insist that liberal democracy is still a moral imperative? 

Before we explore, by “Asia”, I focus my article on four Asian Tigers (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) and China because these have become the most popular in my time on campus. 

This article analyses the developmental state theory in how the five Asian countries’ developmental authoritarianism suited their unique historical priority for national security and rapid development. It also notes the trade offs in areas such as political freedoms, economic concentration and demographic sustainability. 

To start, the five countries lacked Europe’s uninterrupted development as modern nation states. Their statehood was interrupted by European colonialism and internal factionalism. Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong faced possible communist expansion from North Korea and China. The latter suffered from 1912 to 1949 a total of 30 million casualties from three civil wars and a world war whilst previously experiencing foreign invasions in the 19th century. Simultaneously, Singapore was surrounded by Malaysia and Indonesia; and faced two major race riots between the Chinese and Malays in 1964.  This insecurity coupled with the Cold War incentivised Confucianism’s emphasis of collective interests over the individual. Thus contributing to greater social tolerance for a state that prioritises development and security over civil liberties.

We can see that external security was secured. Though widely different in governance, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore were able to resist total takeover by larger polities due to their presentation as coherent actors. China didn’t just successfully resist, but became a great power as its one party system presented a large unified mechanism, ready to deter any foreign power through a disciplined military and strong economy. 

Internal security also paid off given that strong central authorities use deterrence to create social compliance and political unity ,  although this has come with trade-offs with civil liberties. Singapore under the People’s Action Party’s administration became one of the top 10 safest countries as it enacted the death penalty against severe crimes, which ensured a deterrence effect against drug trafficking coming from the Golden Triangle. South Korea and Taiwan’s adoption of military laws and selective civil freedoms from the 1950s to 1980s, instilled long term communal respect, even after democratisation. For example, the 2024 Steffensmeier report measured that Taiwan and South Korea ranked lower in youth crime than the US and West.  China, the country shaped by its civil wars, has maintained a homogenous society and the death penalty against terrorism. This mix of deterrence and cohesion could be explored as a link to the state’s ability to reduce the risks of radicalisation of the youth seen worldwide . 

The countries’ domestic security was sustained by their authoritarian regimes’ rapid economic growth.  The lack of technological and industrial know-how that Europe had since the 19th century prompted the Asian authoritarian regimes to capitalise on de-industrialised Western Europe’s demand for large imports. This was done through its export-oriented economy that was sustained by a young and cheap workforce.  Thus, Western European countries invested in Asian industries whilst transferring crucial technological know-how for their future sectors.

This long term economic planning combined with massive spendings in vocational education allowed the Asian Tigers’ growth to be 6% of GDP per annum from 1960 to 1995.  Whilst China has seen a growth of an average of 9.7% per annum from 1979 to 2006.  All five gradually transitioned from poor agricultural economies to key players for finances (Singapore, Hong Kong), semiconductors (Taiwan), digital technology exports (South Korea) and green technology (China with solar panels and electric cars). 

However, this developmental state centred on strong central rule and rapid development was only designed for the specific context of mass poverty and existential insecurity. By the 1980s to 2000s, the four Asian Tigers had an educated and wealthier middle class that struggled for power with the status quo elites.  This has led to bloody repressions in South Korea (Gwangju Uprising: 2300 killed), Taiwan (White Terror under Martial Law: 13,206 victims) , and China (200,000 troops deployed in 1989 Tiananmen massacre killing thousands). 

Socio-economic inequality also emerged as a caveat of rapid growth. In South Korea, the top four chaebols or large family run conglomerates (Samsung , LG, Hyundai , SK)  form 40% of South Korea’s GDP. This has led to increased irregular lobbying on politicians that has led to arrests on key politicians such as former president Park Geun Hye in 2017. Across the sea, China’s growth benefited mainly coastal regions that had access to Western European investment and manufacturing. Inland regions were more marginalised from this growth. In Hong Kong, the rise of property oligarchs and government’s lack of regulation against over-speculation made housing unaffordable for middle class Hong Kong residents. This led to a widespread theme of small “coffin homes” that barely fit a person.

This lack of social-economic opportunities caused by inequality has correlation with greater hesitation for family creation. This leads to a smaller pool of the next generation of workers. In the UN Asia Pacific Ageing Report 2022, China, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea were predicted to be in the top 10 by 2050 with the highest percentage of those aged 80 or more (First, Hong Kong: 17.7% ; Second, South Korea: 15.9%; Fourth, Singapore: 13.5 %, Seventh, China: 10.3%) . This can potentially lead to smaller productivity and heavier burdens on the younger working population. 

To conclude, the division was never the fact  that the Asian success which  we enjoy has authoritarian foundations, but rather how we react to it. Do we continue the moral crusade of Western liberal democracy , or study Asia on their own terms — based on results and context with acknowledgement of its downsides? 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

  1. Vu, Linh Dam. The Sovereignty of the War Dead: Martyrs, Memorials, and the Makings of Modern China, 1912-1949. [s.l.] : eScholarship, University of California. 2017.
  1.  « Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia 1945-1983 », Far Eastern economic review. 1985, vol.128 no 19. 1985.
  1. Chan, Elton. Towards Confucian Republicanism: Democracy as Virtue Politics. 1re éd. New York : Oxford University Press. 2025.
  1.  Heath, Timothy R. China’s New Governing Party Paradigm: Political Renewal and the Pursuit of National Rejuvenation. 1re éd. United Kingdom : Routledge. 2014.
  1. « Singapore Takes Top Spot in Asian Expat Liveability Rankings; Hong Kong Fails to Get back to Top 20 », CFO Innovation Asia. 2018.
  1. Steffensmeier, Darrell, Jessie Slepicka, Tebogo Sebeelo, et al. « Age and the Distribution of Crime in Botswana, Africa: Comparisons with the USA, Taiwan, South Korea, Namibia, and HG Invariance Norm », Asian journal of criminology. 2024, vol.19 no 4. p. 617‑638.
  1. Sicilia, David B et David G Wittner. Strands of modernization : the circulation of technology and business practices in East Asia, 1850-1920. 1re éd. Toronto : University of Toronto Press. 2021.
  1.  SORIN-GEORGE TOMA. « LEARNING FROM THE ASIAN TIGERS: LESSONS IN ECONOMIC GROWTH », Analele Universităţii Constantin Brâncuşi din Târgu Jiu : Seria Economie. 2019 no 3. p. 63‑69.
  1. Wu, Ho-Mou et Yang Yao. Reform and Development in China: What Can China Offer the Developing World. 1re éd. London : Routledge. 2011. vol.82.
  1. Sok-yong, Hwang, Lee Jae-eui, et Jeon Yong-ho. Gwangju Uprising: The Rebellion for Democracy in South Korea. 2e éd. London : Verso. 2022.
  1.  Wang, Austin Horng-En. « Political Opportunity Structure Conditions the Legacy of Political Violence », The Journal of conflict resolution. 2026, vol.70 no 1. p. 90‑114.
  1.  Korea’s top 4 conglomerates take up 40% of GDP in 2023 – The Korea Times. 2024. URL : https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/business/banking-finance/20241009/south-koreas-major-conglomerates-dominate-40-percent-of-gdp-in-2023 
  1. Zhang, Jun. « Housing Affordability in Hong Kong and Its Socio-Political Implications » in Binh Thi An Trinh et Chi Zhang (eds.). Governance in Transitional Societies in East and Southeast Asia. Singapore : Palgrave Macmillan. 2023, p. 121‑147.
  1.  Asia-Pacific Report on Population Ageing 2022 : Trends, policies and good practices regarding older persons and population ageing | Escap. Available at: https://www.unescap.org/kp/2022/asia-pacific-report-population-ageing-2022-trends-policies-and-good-practices-regarding 

Beyond Postmodern Individualism: When the Absence of Meaning Becomes a Political Risk

by Paul-Aurèle Allegrini

In 1970, John Lennon ended his song “God” by declaring that he believed only in “Yoko and (himself).” After renouncing religion, ideology, and cultural icons, what only remained was his relationship with his wife. The gesture reflected a broader intellectual climate post-World War 2 : a growing distrust of inherited structures and overarching narratives. The world narrowed down to the most immediate circle.

This skepticism did not begin in the 1960s. In the 19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche questioned the supposed neutrality of morality and faith, and exposed their historical construction and their entanglement with relations of power. In the 20th century, political catastrophes intensified this distrust. The general confidence in universalist narratives fractured, and the concept of rationality, regarded since the Enlightenment as the instrument of human emancipation, appeared capable of organizing massacres as well. Gilles Deleuze formulated in a 1987 conference that the coldest exercise of rationality had manifested itself in the organization of concentration camps. 

The postwar order also transformed the conditions of existence. Exchanges accelerated globally, information multiplied, identities became more fluid. Polish sociologist Zygmunt Bauman described this condition as “liquid modernity” :  the instability of social bonds and the reversibility of commitments and structures. In parallel, Jean-François Lyotard spoke of post-modernity as an “incredulity toward metanarratives.” Meaning became impossible to achieve, which prompted a nihilistic or ironic vision of human existence, or became reduced to subjective experiences.

This shift forms the core of the problem. As meaning is no longer assumed collectively by any form of morals or belief, it is redirected toward the individual. Even the desire for a common narrative becomes suspicious, because it evokes the possibility of domination. 

In the vacuum left by the collapse of grand structures, responses become either private or unstable. In Jim Morrison’s dionysian aesthetic, shamanic trances promise a way out through loss of control, a shared intensity in musical concerts experienced as immediate truth. In the manga Neon Genesis Evangelion, the “Third Impact” idea of merging subjectivities seeks to abolish separation between consciousnesses in order to eliminate solitude itself. In Fellini’s La Dolce Vita, or its modern homage in Sorrentino’s La Grande Bellezza, endless celebration and aestheticization appear as attempts to sublimate an existential void no longer framed by any kind collective narrative. These works differ in tone and medium, yet they share a common feature: they seek to find a post-post-modern form of truth, of absolute, to fill the existential void.

The privatization of that void is not neutral either, and also follows existing socio-economic hierarchies. “Love”, in its contemporary sense of sexual and romantic action, often invoked as a universal refuge against the absurdity of human existence, operates within systems of selection and competition. Dating applications classify, filter, and optimize profiles according to implicit societal standards of desirability. The recent growth of “looksmaxxing” communities, in which individuals attempt to optimize their physical appearance according to algorithmic standards of desirability, illustrates how market logic penetrates intimacy itself. Even the idea of sexual fluidity is rigidified into products and micro-struggles that are marketable and scalable on a global scale into corporate-friendly identity politics.  “Rave culture” or any kind of ecstatic self-loss experiences are places of underlying social control and regulations and lose their fluid essence when they become “mainstream” — which again shows the impossibility of a global-scale deconstruction of domination structures.

The more meaning is deinstitutionalized, the more responsibility for producing it falls on individuals. This burden is not experienced equally, because some have the material, cultural and geographical conditions necessary to inhabit philosophical instability and others do not. 

But the need for narrative and belonging does not disappear. When no legitimate common horizon seems available, and material conditions degrade, simpler narratives find space to thrive. The success of figures such as Donald Trump, and more broadly of nationalist and populist movements, cannot be explained solely by media polarization or manipulation. It corresponds to the promise of restoring an intelligible “we” within a morally fragmented environment.

This reconstruction of a form of common takes exclusive and violent forms. The saturation of the structural void by simplified narratives recreate rigid and excluding structures of domination similar to those post-modernism sought to deconstruct. Hannah Arendt insisted on the necessity of a shared world for politics to exist at all. When no shared world or common roots exist, attempts at “rebuilding” are really just creation of homogenizing and antagonistic structures.

Thus, the contemporary problem of meaning lies in the difficulty of instituting shared meanings that do not solidify into excluding domination. The absence of collective frameworks does not eliminate the desire for belonging, nor make subjectivities unite into a harmonious and unexcluding unity — a collective “blob”, so to speak. It rather weakens humanity’s ability to live collectively, and alienates individuals.

The question therefore remains open. How can a common world be produced without reproducing the logics of exclusion that critical thought has exposed? How can collective meaning be articulated without reverting to totalizing myths? Certainly, subjectivities and individualistic perceptions exist within any structural form and must be considered with importance, but the refusal of any universalistic or shared horizon carries political risks for human coexistence.

References : 

Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.

Bauman, Zygmunt. Liquid Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.

Deleuze, Gilles. “What Is the Creative Act?” Lecture at FEMIS, Paris, May 17, 1987.

Durkheim, Émile. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Translated by John A. Spaulding 

and George Simpson. New York: Free Press, 1951. Originally published 1897.

Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 

Translated by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984. Originally published 1979.

Nietzsche, Friedrich. On the Genealogy of Morality. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967. Originally published 1887.

Lennon, John. “God.” On John Lennon/Plastic Ono Band. Apple Records, 1970.

Fellini, Federico, director. La Dolce Vita. Italy: Cineriz, 1960.

Sorrentino, Paolo, director. La Grande Bellezza. Italy: Indigo Film, 2013.

Anno, Hideaki, director. Neon Genesis Evangelion. Tokyo: TV Tokyo, 1995.