Born This WEIS – the 2024 edition of Sciences Po’s annual inter-campus sports competition saw historical achievements, most notably credited to Le Havre campus athletes. An introspective interview with AS President, Viola del Corona, runs us through the entirety of events and matches held in Nancy. She describes in detail LH’s pathway towards our podium victory. The fact that a list is required to entail all accomplishments in this article also demonstrates the significant progress in sportsmanship that our campus has undergone, which has ultimately paid off.
WEIS prizes by LH!
5 trophies:
• Prix d’Ambience (first place)
• 2nd place Table tennis
• 2nd place Cheer
• 2nd place Foot f
• 2nd place Foot m
Semifinals
• semis for Volley (4th place)
• semis for Rugby f (4th place)
• playoffs for Basket m (4th place)
Upon arrival at the sports facility – straight after an 8 hour bus journey – the restless weekend of competitions commenced. Viola recalls her own participation in Female Basketball, Football and Rugby.
‘The second day was pretty intense for female sports because there was the entire football tournament all crammed into one day,’ she recalls, reflecting the intensity of physical activity due to the time constraint of 3 days. Nevertheless, Viola acknowledges that events including the official opening ceremony, the barathon, and club night organised by Nancy’s Bureau des Sports (BDS) were populated with students of all campuses. With a rap song featuring LH PROPA members Gabriel & Sara performed live, the atmosphere at the club night was undeniably pleasant. It underscored conviviality and enjoyment after strenuous competition.
When asked about her favourite event, Viola chuckles as she expresses her satisfaction with the female Football team’s accomplishments. “We got to the semi-finals, which was amazing because then we won against Poitiers … at the final — like I just started crying … a bit of it was because of how tired I was […] the emotions were just incredible’.
Female football reached 2nd place overall. (image: Football F team – shot by Thomas Funkleder)
Viola noted, though, that members “didn’t even expect to go past the group phase. This is actually something that was common to most sports.” This is evident in male Football, where Ryoma’s goal in their 3rd round propelled LH into the semifinals for the 1st time in history. More astounding was that this happened while player Anis was carrying an injured hamstring. His persistence on the field, along with the others, carried them all the way into Football M Finals, again for the first time in history.
‘I never expected us to go this far… I’m so happy’, expresses Taiga Shitara, captain of the Football team.
LH WEIS Football M team – shot by Thomas Funkleder
The Football M team got their first ever win last year against Dijon, during Minicrit 2024. Previously the LH team had never made it past the group stage.
Another achievement of the season was bagged by the cheerleading squad; LH placed 2nd overall.
This notably occurred despite the lack of coaches provided to the LH Cheer team, an advantage that some campuses possessed. The increase in frequency of cheer practices seemed to pay off in the precision of movement and accuracy of jumps, as seen in playback videos.“Our team has worked so hard for WEIS and I’m really proud of all of us! We’re going to keep our minicrit plans a little secret for those outside the cheer team, but expect the biggest, boldest, and brightest performance our campus has seen yet,” hints Noelani Aung, co-captain of LH Cheer. WEIS’ stunts included Noelani’s clock stunt and Nicky’s suspended front flip, both completed without a trace of sweat and drove supporters into a standing ovation towards the end of the performance. (image: Noelani’s clock stunt – shot by Thomas Funkleder)
In addition to the conventional lineup, this year’s surprise sport was table tennis. LH representatives Hugo and Sara took the trophy home with 1st-Runner Up. Likewise, there was a lack of resources due to campus budget constraints. A conversation with Hugo informs that ‘there’s not much preparation…to the extent that we actually did not have our own rackets and table tennis balls for Sara’. Nevertheless, his highlight of the day was the LH v. Menton match.
“We were losing by 10 to 7… the opponent only needed 1 single point to secure the victory. However, with a bit of luck…. we secured five consecutive points, and we beat Menton by 12 to 10… it was a very memorable moment for me.” Hugo plans on taking periodic advantage of the table on campus to foster the development of technique. (image: Hugo & Sara v Nancy – shot by Thomas Funkleder)
Lastly, it is important to note that LH received commendation for athletic sportsmanship, albeit some mishaps construed by other campuses. Viola compliments her AS team, expressing gratitude for Orso and Madhava for communicating with French logistics. She also notes that campuses “loved AS… the whole delegation received a lot of compliments from Nancy saying that we were really respectful … something to be really proud of I think.”
Le Havre placed 3rd Overall in WEIS 2024.
(image: AS Le Havre from left to right – Orso, Madhava, Viola, Yasumasa, Mathilde, Nodoka, Anya) – shot by Thomas Funkleder
During the October elections, the Union Étudiante won 49% of votes, a landslide by any metric. We thank you for your mobilisation and your trust! This victory gives us the chance to have two Le Havre students elected to the Conseil de la Vie Étudiante et de la Formation (CVEF) : Lino Battin this year and Lisa Debaud next year. But what exactly is the CVEF? The Union Étudiante will explain the stakes and how we plan to ensure that these seats benefit the entire campus.
The CVEF is the council where students are the best represented proportionally : 8 students out of 18 seats (the rest of the seats are allocated to professors, teachers, researchers, and staff representatives). This council “determines the conditions under which users exercise their political and union freedoms and cultural activities“, a key role given the authoritarian practices of the administration in recent months. The direct interest for our campus is that the CVEF is also the body which “oversees and coordinates student life in regional campuses.”
Practically speaking, the CVEF votes on the academic framework, student life regulations, and maintains the link with student associations. It is truly the council most connected to what happens on our campus; for example, the amount of subsidies for Le Havre associations are voted on there. It is also the place where we will express our demands to have more teachers and a wider range of courses on regional campuses.
It’s true that this council isn’t very powerful within the organisational structure of Sciences Po: it has no decision-making authority and is only consulted for major decisions that affect students. Most of the power is held by the Conseil de l’Institut and especially by the Conseil d’Administration of the FNSP (the private part of the institution). The latter consists of only two students, while “ten founding members” who are very disconnected from the interests of Sciences Po and its students—such as the directors of Carrefour and CMA-CGM—co-opt each other year after year. Through this system, power is convoluted, turning the school into a business by increasing tuition fees while neglecting social justice and a quality, free, and emancipating education.
Despite this blatant lack of democracy, we will do our best through the seats we won at the elections to make the voices of Le Havre students heard. This is why we will organise meetings before the CVEF councils, where we will present the agenda of the CVEF council to help everyone understand what is being decided far away in Paris. This meeting will provide for students on our campus an opportunity to discuss our key points for the council in defence of our campus and to hear any suggestions or requests you may want to address to Paris, including positions to adopt, arguments, or any other concerns.
We hope to see many of you at these meetings, where everyone is welcome !
On the 24th of October 2024, Malaysian ambassador to France Datuk Eldeen Husaini bin Mohd Hashim paid a visit to Sciences Po’s Le Havre campus. In addition to addressing the entire campus community during a lunchtime guest lecture, he also took the time to answer questions on his career as a diplomat, the Malaysian national project, and the diplomatic tightrope that Malaysia is currently walking, as a Southeast Asian state that finds itself betwixt and between the spheres of influence of geopolitical hegemons like China and the United States. His conversation with Syontoni Hattori-Chatterjee and Yoann Guillot of Le Dragon Déchaîné was as follows:
LDD: Well, thank you so much, Your Excellency, for being here with us today for this interview.
LDD: Good morning, thank you for agreeing to speak to us. To start, many students on our campus are interested in diplomacy and careers in this field, especially focused on the Asia-Pacific region, which is the main area of interest at our university. Could you share what a typical day in the life of an ambassador is like?
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: Oh, okay. It’s a very general and broad question. But I think, like anyone else, I wake up and go to work. For me, each day starts with a bit of inspiration—I listen to motivational speeches or songs to get hyped. I spend about 15 minutes on that, then I dive into my day by checking in with my colleagues about the schedule and duties for the day.
From there, it’s mostly meetings and appointments. I love meeting people, connecting, and engaging, so as an ambassador, I’m often out of the office. Ambassadors are always on the move, expanding engagement and building connections. There are really two goals: first, to establish and strengthen relationships and second, to represent Malaysia, to introduce our country and its culture to different groups. So, for instance, today’s goal is to introduce Malaysian diplomacy to university students, like you.
Beyond that, we attend official meetings, receptions, and events. These gatherings are important because they allow us to engage with others, exchange views, and strengthen diplomatic ties. In the evening, if there are no further engagements, I might relax, catch up on the news, or call colleagues to discuss the next activities. So, as an ambassador, each day is full of connecting, discussing, and sharing.
LDD: That sounds fascinating! Could you tell us a bit about your background and how you became an ambassador? What kind of studies or experiences prepared you for this career?
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: Sure. I studied law in the United Kingdom for three years, initially intending to become a lawyer. I practiced law briefly, for less than two years, then worked as a consultant with an American company for a year. But I always had a fascination with military life—I wanted to pursue that path. However, my parents strongly objected, so I decided to go into government instead.
Given my legal background and overseas studies, I was placed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At that time, there was a talent-scouting system where certain individuals were selected for specific roles. Although they said it was optional, it was actually more of an instruction. I was chosen for negotiation, so I attended many courses and forums to hone my negotiation skills. My first department assignment was in East Asia, covering China, Japan, and Korea. Later, I handled the Southeast Asia region, North Africa, and African departments.
My postings took me to Japan for six years, back to Malaysia as a Southeast Asia specialist, then to Australia, India, Cambodia, and now, finally, to France. This is my first posting in Europe. Over my 28-year career, negotiation has been a constant theme. I’ve been fortunate—or perhaps unfortunate, depending on how you view it—to handle negotiations on high-stakes issues, including bilateral relations, hostage rescues, evacuations, and conflict situations. These experiences taught me the art of negotiation, which I now pass on to junior officers.
LDD: That’s really impressive. It sounds like you’ve had a rewarding career with a lot of impactful moments.
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: Yes, absolutely. It’s both challenging and rewarding in many ways. Some of the situations are quite dramatic, and negotiation can either help or complicate things. There’s a lot more to share, but I could talk for days about negotiation strategies! But yes, these experiences are valuable, and I’m grateful to have had them.
LDD: Thank you for sharing that. Moving on, Malaysia is known for its multicultural society, with various communities like Malay, Chinese, Indian, and many others living together in one country. While this creates a rich culture, it can also bring tensions. How would you define what it means to be Malaysian, given this diversity?
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: People often call Malaysia a “melting pot.” It’s true; we’re a country of many communities, and others are sometimes amazed at how we manage the diversity. Some scholars refer to us not just as a melting pot, but as a “time bomb,” due to the potential tensions that can arise from different beliefs, ethnicities, and priorities. If these differences aren’t managed diplomatically, professionally, or politically, they can become a “time bomb” rather than a melting pot, leading to conflict.
Currently, we’re still a melting pot, largely because of tolerance, understanding, and respect among our communities. It’s not easy, and we’ve had conflicts in the past while learning to understand one another. To succeed, I believe a nation like ours needs to embrace moderation, tolerance, mutual respect, and equal opportunities.
The stability of our multicultural society depends largely on the people, but it can also be influenced by political figures. For a long time—about 60 years—our politics were stable, and we thrived. However, in recent years, we’ve faced political changes, with shifts in government, which have created instability. When the foundation is stable, people tend to unite; when it shakes, tensions rise. But I believe in the importance of dialogue, finding common ground, and resolving issues peacefully.
LDD: That’s a powerful insight. So, Malaysia is indeed a melting pot, and keeping it that way requires a lot of effort, tolerance, and respect.
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: Yes, exactly. Malaysia and other Southeast Asian countries share this trait. We are “melting pots,” and it’s about maintaining harmony through tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding. If anyone wants to understand Malaysia or ASEAN as a region, they should start with this idea: a melting pot sustained by respect and moderation.
LDD: Yeah. Do you feel like your training as a negotiator has helped you understand not just how to talk to other people about your country, but also the political situation in your country better?
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: You know, I would love to encourage you to take up negotiation skills because if you are in this job, in the scope of international relations, or if your interest is to become a diplomat, ambassador, or a politician, this is the skill you need. The first skill you need is actually negotiation. Because in negotiation, you understand how to control people, how to plan, how to ensure you achieve your goals, and how to give, you know?
It’s all about give and take. In negotiation, there’s no such formula—although many books mention it—that there’s a segment where they say negotiation is a win-win situation. But there’s no real formula in negotiation called “win-win.” In negotiation, it’s always about win or lose. It’s either you win, or you lose. But in politics, if you go beyond that, to cover whatever loss someone has, and not to openly show that someone else has won, you go to the public and call it a win-win situation. That’s how politicians and diplomats operate—to calm the public.
LDD: Yes, to keep public perception under control.
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: Exactly. Because what happens behind the wall stays behind the wall. What the public knows isn’t always the whole story. So, the first rule in negotiation is that there’s no win-win situation. Win-win is a gimmick for the public.
LDD: Mhmm.
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: In any scenario—take a hostage situation, for example—there’s no “win-win.” It’s never just, “I give you cash; we get back the hostage.” There’s no such thing. It’s always a matter of winning or losing. But this skill is essential if you want to be a diplomat, politician, lawyer, consultant—anything in this field. Because once you have this skill, I think you could be placed anywhere in the world and thrive.
For me, I’ve been here for nearly 30 years in this field, and every day is exciting. Every day, there’s something new to learn. I really hope that younger generations have the same opportunity to develop these specific skills. There are many skills to learn, but negotiation is one I think everyone should have.
LDD: Mhmm. Thank you. Now, on a different topic—it seems clear that today, diplomatic relations between China and the U.S. are becoming more complex due to rising tensions and challenging issues. Many Southeast Asian countries seem to aim for a more balanced stance between the two. How do you think Malaysia is managing this situation? How is Malaysia positioning itself on the international stage given these rising tensions?
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: Good question. In the past, the situation was clear-cut because the United States had a long-standing influence, while China’s rise came later. But as China started to awaken as a giant, the U.S. grew concerned, and tensions escalated as both nations sought global support. Southeast Asia, especially, has been a focal point for China. They’ve built relationships through trade, investment, and historical connections that go back centuries to when traders would travel here. This historical and cultural connection is something unique to China’s relationships in Southeast Asia.
In contrast, the U.S. doesn’t have the same depth of historical ties with Southeast Asia. Instead, they’ve looked to regions like Europe and Africa to strengthen alliances. So, now, both China and the U.S. are competing globally, even within each other’s traditional spheres of influence. This rivalry creates a situation where smaller countries, including those in Southeast Asia, often feel pressured to choose sides.
For Malaysia, though, we’ve been clear. When the Americans approach us, we explain that China is not a threat to us. China has been an economic partner for a long time, just as the U.S. has. We believe that balance is possible and that trade and investment can bridge these divides.
Globally, everything is about trade and investment. That’s the main connection. Beyond that, there’s also culture and people-to-people connections. But if you go beyond trade, then you’re talking about war. So there are three possibilities: trade, culture, and then war. We’re focused on keeping it about trade and investment. But, even then, trade can sometimes lead to a trade war.
LDD: Right.
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: Exactly. Smaller countries like Malaysia and the rest of Southeast Asia are very clear about not wanting to get caught in the middle of this. So when asked to choose sides, we simply say, “No, we don’t want to choose,” because we want strong friendships with both. But it’s challenging. The trade war is escalating, and as you can see globally, conflicts are increasing. Some of these conflicts started between two countries but have grown due to outside support, which amplifies the issues.
For example, you look at Russia and Ukraine or Israel and Palestine—these conflicts began between specific groups, but they escalate as people take sides and support one over the other, often with trade and weapons. Globally, if you understand diplomacy, you’d see there’s no need for war; it’s just about survival and supply chains. Trading weapons has become part of this trade, and it stokes these conflicts further.
LDD: Mhmm.
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: So, to answer your question—Malaysia’s stance on the U.S. and China is simple. Both are business partners, and we approach both with mutual respect. We’re committed to maintaining neutrality because we believe both should have equal opportunities to engage in business with Malaysia and Southeast Asia.
LDD: Thank you. That’s very comprehensive and insightful. It’s certainly interesting to see the role the economy plays here. But looking to the future, if these powers continue on a path toward escalating conflict. Do you think it would be possible for a country to maintain a neutral stance, especially if there’s a shift toward open conflict?
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: If conflict escalates to war, neutrality becomes almost impossible. Diplomacy is always the first line of defense. Once that fails and war begins, there’s no turning back. War brings destruction, followed by the long process of rebuilding and the eventual return to diplomacy. This is why it’s crucial for entities like the United Nations to promote de-escalation. War between nuclear powers, for instance, would have devastating, irreversible outcomes.
Diplomats work tirelessly to prevent such escalations. Although our work involves receptions and events, the essence of diplomacy is about preventing conflict. Some people think traditional face-to-face engagement is outdated, but it’s crucial. Without it, we’re left with violence, which comes with a heavy price. If a situation escalates into war, survival becomes the focus, not diplomacy.
The choices of leaders are essential because they influence whether conflict escalates or cools. Education institutions also play a key role in shaping future leaders and their approach—whether they’re more aggressive or diplomatic.
If war does come, there’s no “win-win.” One side will prevail, but the path forward after war is complex and costly.
LDD: Considering ASEAN’s growing role, do you think it can help resolve regional conflicts like the one in Myanmar? Or should ASEAN remain focused on economic cooperation rather than political issues?
H.E. Bin Mohd Hashim: ASEAN has a principle of non-interference, respecting each country’s sovereignty, yet we can’t ignore the ripple effects of conflict in one nation on the entire region’s economy and stability. Myanmar’s internal issues are a longstanding concern. We’ve often reminded them of the need to avoid disrupting the broader economic network that binds ASEAN.
We have the “Five-Point Consensus,” which urges Myanmar to address its issues without destabilizing the region. Right now, we’re focusing on diplomacy and sending special envoys to Myanmar, which is a slow process, but essential. Economically, stability is our priority, not political control. We respect each country’s leadership structure, but we also seek harmony for trade and regional growth.
International sanctions are isolating Myanmar, with some countries even urging ASEAN to exclude them. However, ASEAN believes in inclusivity, so we allow Myanmar a representative role rather than full leadership presence in ASEAN meetings. This way, ASEAN remains united while supporting Myanmar’s gradual reintegration.
We hope that by 2025, when we chair ASEAN, Myanmar will be back on track, and the region will be more stable.
LDD: Thank you for sharing your insights! That’s all the time we have.
After the results of the U.S. presidential election became decisively known around the world, I admittedly spent the rest of Wednesday, November 6th, in a depressive slump. I was scared not only for the future of American democracy, economic management, and domestic climate policy, but also worried about the potential regressive impacts of this closely watched election on global environmental governance. Dr. Fengshi Wu’s talk with students the following day on the dynamics of environmental protests worldwide gave me a much needed boost of hope.
The Associate Professor of Political Science and International Relations at UNSW Sydney first passionately presented her work on the history of environmentalist movements around the world. But as she critically emphasized, most of the activists of these movements, including Filipino protesters against World Bank-funded hydropower dams that would displace Indigenous communities in the 1980s, did not define themselves as environmentalists. The resistance of activists like Chico Mendes to protect the Amazon rainforest consisted of directly impacted individuals and communities fighting for the land that they lived on, the air they breathed, and the water and food sources they needed to survive. These kinds of deeply local struggles for survival were and still are shared across societies, from democratic to authoritarian and everything in between. I was convinced by Dr. Wu’s assertion that the lifeblood of environmental movements lies in their ability to take climate change and biodiversity issues from the global level to the local, and thereby speak to the immediate needs of communities facing these issues now. I also found it striking how she connected ground-level mobilization of communities addressed to direct threats such as air pollution in Pakistan or the disappearance of a river representing a sole potable water source in Kazakhstan to the triple influence of local laws, national policy, and international funding from organizations like the World Bank.
I was reminded of the work of Julian Aguon, Chamorro human rights lawyer and founder of Blue Ocean Law, a Guam-based international law firm specializing in Indigenous rights and self-determination and environmental justice cases in the Pacific. I heard him speak two years ago at California State University Northridge’s Fifth Civil Discourse and Social Change initiative Social Justice Student Research Conference. Also an author, Aguon discussed using environmental activism as responsible grief work to process the loss of lifeways, family, and tradition as a result of climate change and a means of driving people past cynicism to environmental justice action through personal stories. Both Aguon and Wu’s presentations were factual but passionate, analyzing a web of international organization-state-community interactions at the level of people and their immediate survival. The presentations moreover advocated vigorously for the centrality of the most marginalized and most impacted communities in our notion of environmental activism.
I also appreciated how Dr. Wu clearly and deftly illustrated some key distinctions between environmental movements in different contexts. Her research showed her that the major difference between protests occurring within a democratic context of rule of law versus a context without these guarantees was the level of repression, violence, and loss of life that protestors faced from the state. Nevertheless, she demonstrated that environmental movements worldwide are facing increasing repression, a symptom of democratic backsliding given that such movements have often pushed for political liberalization. She responded to audience questions clarifying that environmental politics’ being depicted as a left-wing, abstract political issue is a problem within Western democracies that does not translate to many other political contexts where the issue is more universalized. She also discussed national and global environmental governance in China, a uniquely high-functioning authoritarian regime whose renewable energy tradition is more driven by fossil-fuel-poor geographic conditions than existential concerns about the ecosystem. I found it especially illuminating to compare this strongly state-led environmental policy model to the contrasting behavior of the rising Chinese middle class, finally able to enjoy comfortable lifestyles of overconsumption that the middle classes of Western democracies have for decades, and thus, understandably, reluctant to forego its new lifestyle. As an American concerned about further U.S. removal from global climate governance, it was interesting to observe a different model that could become the future of environmental leadership in international relations.
I am sure that I speak for my peers in expressing my gratitude to Havrais Dire for organizing this conference amidst what is always a busy (and perhaps draining) time studying political science in the tumultuous world we live in today. I hope that sharing some of my reflections on Dr. Fengshi Wu’s presentation through this article gives other students a similar renewed hope in our power to affect local change for global environmental progress.
On my recent visit to Serbia in July of 2024, on the way from the airport to the centre of Belgrade alongside the stark Genex tower, I witnessed an interesting display. The highway to the centre was lined with small Serbian tricolour flags but also a stranger sight – that of a line of equally numerous blue flags with yellow stars.
While seeing EU flags in Paris or Bucharest wouldn’t be that strange, their presence in Belgrade mere blocks from the location of the Yugoslav Ministry of Defence Building damaged in the NATO bombings of 1999 seemed bizarre, especially considering many Serbs still feel lukewarm at best towards EU member states like Germany, France, and Italy who participated in the air campaign against them – a sentiment illustrated clearly by the fact that EU accession is still seen more negatively in Serbia than in their Western Balkan neighbours according to IRI, with 44% of poll respondents stating they would vote in favour of joining, compared to 89% in Kosovo and 92% in Albania more than 2 decades after the event. So, what was going on?
Unbeknownst to me, the flags had been put up for an interesting ‘trade summit’ on July 19th between German chancellor Olaf Scholz and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić which led to the re-opening of the Jadar valley lithium mine project in Western Serbia by British-Australian mining and refining firm Rio Tinto. According to Reuters, this project could fulfill up to 90% of Europe’s current lithium needs, a material used in the manufacturing of lithium-ion batteries and thus critical to the Union’s aim of achieving net zero emissions by 2050. This also falls in line with other major EU objectives such as the current endeavour at securing more secure raw material procurement from partners – due to mistrust of Chinese suppliers and volatile supply chains owed to waning European influence in African nations like Niger – and playing catch-up to China and the US in high tech industries such as the manufacturing of electric vehicles.
I found the reopening of the mine project especially interesting given that less than 2 years ago, Serbia had shut down the project after mass protests over environmental concerns. The complete U-turn in policy has unsurprisingly raised eyebrows yet also revealed an increasing trend in Serbian politics – a desire to mend ties with the EU.
Despite the aforementioned mistrust towards the EU from the Serbian population (one further supported by a similar 2024 poll by Balkan Barometer), Vučić seems increasingly interested in developing ties, in large part due to the economic payoffs that these could yield.
The most prominent manifestations of this interest are Serbia’s repeated attempts to join the Union itself, with its first formal request being submitted on the 22nd of December 2009. The EU granted Serbia official candidate status in 2012 following recommendations from both the European Commission and Council to do so. A further step towards closer integration has come in the form of the recently ratified Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) establishing a framework to bring the country into closer political and economic relations with the bloc.
The main drivers for this shift in policy appear to be the economic incentives offered by both membership of and outside forms of economic cooperation with the EU. For example, the EU has invested heavily in Serbia as part of official multilateral aid initiatives like the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance II (IPA II) – a financial policy tool used to support countries aspiring to join the union, with 1.5 billion Euros in grants being made available to the country between 2012 and 2022 according to the Delegation of the EU to Serbia, and significant private sector support for Serbia’s economy with the EU being Serbia’s largest trade partner with $4bn (13.2%) worth of its exports going to Germany alone in 2022 according to OECD data. Furthermore, without Serbia’s being a member of the Union, travel for Serbian nationals in the EU was made visa free from December 2009, with Serbia returning the favour shortly thereafter, making cross border exchanges significantly easier and thereby supporting labour migration and creating a system of remittances that have supported EU soft power in Serbia.
Another example of more symbolic political engagement with the EU has been Serbia’s toeing of the EU foreign policy line vis-à-vis the Russian war in Ukraine, a feat notable given Serbia’s initial support of the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Serbia furthermore voted to suspend Russian membership of the UN human rights council in April 2022, a move which shows a general trend of Serbia’s distancing itself from Russia in favour of closer ties with the EU.
And yet cosying up to the EU doesn’t mean Serbia has abandoned ties with its traditional partners – if anything it has intensified them. This is especially true for relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The root of the recent relationship stems from the 1990s when China supported SFR Yugoslavia which would later become Serbia against the NATO bombing campaign because, as Peking University and University of California San Diego graduate Dr. Suizheng Zhao points out, it saw the NATO-backed secession of Kosovo as a dangerous precedent that could inspire armed separatism in the provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang as well. The stance of China was further intensified by the destruction of the PRC embassy in Belgrade which killed 3 Chinese nationals, and injured a further 20 others.
Since then the two have cemented their relationship through political efforts including the affirmation of a strategic partnership in 2009, which was subsequently upgraded to a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ in 2016. This relationship and its origins were showcased recently by Chairman Xi’s visit to Belgrade in May of 2024 to commemorate the anniversary of the aforementioned NATO bombings that he said China will “never forget.”
More importantly however, China has invested heavily into economic cooperation in an official capacity with over US$10.3 billion in bilateral aid being provided between 2009 and 2021 within the China-CEEC (Central and Eastern European Countries) program alone – a whopping 70% of all spending within that initiative, and Serbia being the first country to sign a free Trade Agreement with China in October 2023, with 90% of products traded between the two parties being exempted from tariffs, 60% of which would be exempted as soon as the agreement came into effect on July 1st 2024.
In a more unofficial, private sector capacity, Chinese firms have also invested an estimated 5.6 billion euros into the country’s economy in the last decade according to an article by Forbes Serbia published in May 2024. The latter point is especially important given that according to the same report over 1,500 companies currently operating in Serbia are majority owned by Chinese stakeholders, with Chinese entrepreneurs being involved in numerous operations including mining (‘Zijin mining’ in Bor), heavy industry (‘Hesteel’ steel making plant in Smederevo) and automotive parts (Minth factories in Šabac and Loznica).
This is all excludes the significant foreign direct investment in Serbian infrastructure including but not limited to sections of the A2 Miloš Veliki Highway linking Belgrade with the south of the country built by publicly owned Chinese construction giants like Shandong Hi-Speed Group and China Communications Construction Company (CCCC). Cumulatively these investments (both public and private) make China the single largest investor in Serbia according to China briefing, rendering it unsurprising that the two are such cordial partners.
Interestingly, however, Serbia has not yet cut ties with its longtime ally Russia despite statements supporting Ukraine in 2023. While bilateral relations are less manifest in recent years than those with China and the EU (at least in economic terms), the two nations still share relatively cordial relations.
Perhaps the most significant reason for this enduring bond stems from a long history of shared interests and support, with the Russian empire being a firm supporter of Slavic and Orthodox nationalist movements in the Balkans against the Ottoman empire as early as the formation of Serbia and other Balkan nations under the 1878 treaty of Berlin.
This support would be expanded in 1914 with Russia entering WW1 in defence of Serbia against Austrian aggression, a fact that Serbs have not forgotten with Czar Nicolas being revered in Serbia as a canonised saint. Monuments distilling the centrality of Russo-Serbian relations in Serbia’s national imagination are plentiful, especially in Belgrade, in which there lie the Church of Saint Sava and a bronze statue of the Czar unveiled in November 2014, less than 100 m away from Novi Dvor, the seat of the Serbian President) in the centre of Belgrade.
While there was a partial break in relations between the two during the cold war due to SFR Yugoslavia wishing to exert greater independence from its larger communist ally following major disagreements between Tito and Stalin in 1948, relations would improve following de-Stalinisation yet remain tepid as Yugoslavia pursued a policy of non-alignment in the cold war, staying out of Soviet organisations like the Warsaw Pact and maintaining relations with Soviet rivals like the USA.
Despite this, the modern Russo-Serbian relationship would be restored and cemented due to the collective hardship endured by the simultaneous collapse of both states in the 1990s, and the NATO bombing campaign against Serbia which Russian President Boris Yeltsin called “open aggression,” according to an article by the BBC. This contributed to the development of strong bilateral relations – a trend that Vučić has worked hard to maintain despite his increasing EU alignment.
However the current relationship between Serbia and Russia rests not only on historical, but also economic and military considerations. Russia still comprises an approximate 3.95% of Serbian exports and 7.18% of imports in 2022, with crude petroleum being Serbia’s primary import from Russia, aiding in the diversification of Serbian energy sources and thus reducing its reliance on coal and hydropower. Moreover, the Serbian Armed forces use primarily former Yugoslav and Soviet military equipment and still purchase numerous weapon systems from Russian manufacturers due to their perceived reliability and similarity to weapons already in service. In this vein, Russia has also gifted Serbia several vehicles including 30 modernised T72 tank variants, 30 upgraded BRDM-2 reconnaissance vehicles and 6 MIG 29 fighter jets to facilitate military cooperation, further underscoring Russia’s vested interest in maintaining strong bilateral relations with Serbia through their combined military ties.
Given all of this information, why the idiosyncrasy? More specifically, why is Serbia trying to have a foot in all camps, a strategy which seems at odds with its strategic interests? The simplest explanation to this seems to be that Vučić is increasingly trying to leverage Serbia’s historical connections and geographical position at the centre of the Western Balkans to make Serbia a ‘middle power’ – a sort of geopolitical conduit and client state between the EU, Russian, and Chinese blocs while asserting Serbia’s independence and deriving certain benefits, such as diversified sources of investment.
Whether this will continue to work in the future is debatable, given the increasing polarisation of the world order into geostrategic blocs like those of the EU and China and its allies, each with their own (possibly competing) supranational structures. One day Serbia may be forced to choose a side, but for now it seems set to continue the balancing act, walking a tightrope between the national interests of Russia, China, and the EU. After all, why should a nation limit itself to one partner, when it can have its cake and eat it too?
Le Dragon Déchaîné 