Shanghai, Hong Kong, Seoul, Singapore, Taipei on Your Tiktok: Prosperity from Authoritarian Development

by Patrick Luo

The Sci-Fi metro stations were clean, ticketing barriers accepting QR Codes and services every 3 minutes. On the train, eyes were on phones, not always on belongings. As I left the station, my Vivo phone snapped a scene: the bright skyscrapers above the parks where residents played freely, whilst my nose captured the smell of Sichuan hotpot.

This is the China we see on our trips or phones.

But just 30 years ago, it was dominated by construction sites as the leadership passed decisions, whilst ensuring dissent was controlled.

If we enjoy China and Asia that developed rapidly with authoritarianism, why do we insist that liberal democracy is still a moral imperative?

Before we explore, by “Asia”, I focus my article on four Asian Tigers (Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong) and China because these have become the most popular in my time on campus.

This article analyses the developmental state theory in how the five Asian countries’ developmental authoritarianism suited their unique historical priority for national security and rapid development. It also notes the trade offs in areas such as political freedoms, economic concentration and demographic sustainability.

To start, the five countries lacked Europe’s uninterrupted development as modern nation states. Their statehood was interrupted by European colonialism and internal factionalism. Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong faced possible communist expansion from North Korea and China. The latter suffered from 1912 to 1949 a total of 30 million casualties from three civil wars and a world war whilst previously experiencing foreign invasions in the 19th century. Simultaneously, Singapore was surrounded by Malaysia and Indonesia; and faced two major race riots between the Chinese and Malays in 1964. This insecurity coupled with the Cold War incentivised Confucianism’s emphasis of collective interests over the individual. Thus contributing to greater social tolerance for a state that prioritises development and security over civil liberties.

We can see that external security was secured. Though widely different in governance, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore were able to resist total takeover by larger polities due to their presentation as coherent actors. China didn’t just successfully resist, but became a great power as its one party system presented a large unified mechanism, ready to deter any foreign power through a disciplined military and strong economy.

Internal security also paid off given that strong central authorities use deterrence to create social compliance and political unity , although this has come with trade-offs with civil liberties. Singapore under the People’s Action Party’s administration became one of the top 10 safest countries as it enacted the death penalty against severe crimes, which ensured a deterrence effect against drug trafficking coming from the Golden Triangle. South Korea and Taiwan’s adoption of military laws and selective civil freedoms from the 1950s to 1980s, instilled long term communal respect, even after democratisation. For example, the 2024 Steffensmeier report measured that Taiwan and South Korea ranked lower in youth crime than the US and West. China, the country shaped by its civil wars, has maintained a homogenous society and the death penalty against terrorism. This mix of deterrence and cohesion could be explored as a link to the state’s ability to reduce the risks of radicalisation of the youth seen worldwide .

The countries’ domestic security was sustained by their authoritarian regimes’ rapid economic growth. The lack of technological and industrial know-how that Europe had since the 19th century prompted the Asian authoritarian regimes to capitalise on de-industrialised Western Europe’s demand for large imports. This was done through its export-oriented economy that was sustained by a young and cheap workforce. Thus, Western European countries invested in Asian industries whilst transferring crucial technological know-how for their future sectors.

This long term economic planning combined with massive spendings in vocational education allowed the Asian Tigers’ growth to be 6% of GDP per annum from 1960 to 1995. Whilst China has seen a growth of an average of 9.7% per annum from 1979 to 2006. All five gradually transitioned from poor agricultural economies to key players for finances (Singapore, Hong Kong), semiconductors (Taiwan), digital technology exports (South Korea) and green technology (China with solar panels and electric cars).

However, this developmental state centred on strong central rule and rapid development was only designed for the specific context of mass poverty and existential insecurity. By the 1980s to 2000s, the four Asian Tigers had an educated and wealthier middle class that struggled for power with the status quo elites. This has led to bloody repressions in South Korea (Gwangju Uprising: 2300 killed), Taiwan (White Terror under Martial Law: 13,206 victims) , and China (200,000 troops deployed in 1989 Tiananmen massacre killing thousands).

Socio-economic inequality also emerged as a caveat of rapid growth. In South Korea, the top four chaebols or large family run conglomerates (Samsung , LG, Hyundai , SK) form 40% of South Korea’s GDP. This has led to increased irregular lobbying on politicians that has led to arrests on key politicians such as former president Park Geun Hye in 2017. Across the sea, China’s growth benefited mainly coastal regions that had access to Western European investment and manufacturing. Inland regions were more marginalised from this growth. In Hong Kong, the rise of property oligarchs and government’s lack of regulation against over-speculation made housing unaffordable for middle class Hong Kong residents. This led to a widespread theme of small “coffin homes” that barely fit a person.

This lack of social-economic opportunities caused by inequality has correlation with greater hesitation for family creation. This leads to a smaller pool of the next generation of workers. In the UN Asia Pacific Ageing Report 2022, China, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea were predicted to be in the top 10 by 2050 with the highest percentage of those aged 80 or more (First, Hong Kong: 17.7% ; Second, South Korea: 15.9%; Fourth, Singapore: 13.5 %, Seventh, China: 10.3%) . This can potentially lead to smaller productivity and heavier burdens on the younger working population.

To conclude, the division was never the fact that the Asian success which we enjoy has authoritarian foundations, but rather how we react to it. Do we continue the moral crusade of Western liberal democracy , or study Asia on their own terms — based on results and context with acknowledgement of its downsides?

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